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CARRIER LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMERCIAL
AIR SAFETY
By JOHN E. STEPHENt
A IR CARRIER legal responsibility for commercial air safety can
normally be thought of as tracking the law of liability. However, sig-
nificant differences are apparent at the outset when the aviation field is
compared to other transport modes. To a large extent, this is because of
extraordinary statutory constraints-both state and federal; however, jur-
isprudence has developed much of the law peculiar to air carrier responsi-
bility.
One law writer has remarked on this distinction, as follows:
All major areas of transportation have their own aggregates of applicable
law; and aviation is unique only because the aggregate of law applicable to
it is more varied and complex and is undergoing rapid and continuous de-
velopment.'
This observation might be justified; but why are the rules applicable to air
transport undergoing "more rapid and continuous development" than the
rules applied to common carriage generally? An obvious answer might be
thought to lie in the dynamic nature of the underlying technology of air
transport as compared to surface and water carriage. And, indeed, it is
likely that this might explain such unexpected developments as proposed
Section 520A, "Ground Damage from Aircraft," of the American Law In-
stitute Restatement of Torts. That section would impose strict liability on
owners and operators of aircraft for injuries to persons or property on
the ground, even though the aircraft operator has exercised "the utmost
care" to prevent harm.! Of this, more will be said. Suffice it to note, for the
moment, that not only the legal philosophers, but the courts, the legisla-
tures, and indeed, the general public, clearly seem to expect a higher stand-
ard of care by air carriers than by other transport modes. What accounts
for these extraordinary standards directed solely at air carriers?
One insurance authority has attributed the situation to overzealous cov-
erage of airline accidents by the news media and to the extrajudicial pre-
occupation of the claimants' bar with preserving the contingent fee system.
He suggests that long-accepted principles of legal responsibility have been
warped and strained by these artificial forces, stating:
The search for truth in modern personal injury litigation has been accom-
panied by a furious attack on legal barriers in the road to recovery, some-
times referred to as old-fashioned, artificial obstructions to justice. Rules
relating to contributory negligence, conflicts of law, privity of contract
t General Counsel, Air Transport Association of America. LL.B., University of Texas. Adviser
to the United States Delegation to the Montreal Conference on the Warsaw Convention, 1966.
1 D. BILLYOu, AIR LAW, 98 (2d ed. 1964).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O17 TORTS § 520A(a), Tentative Draft No. 12, American Law In-
stitute (1966).
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and the art of pleading are all termed relics of the past. At the same time
old-fashioned legal doctrines and rules which may assist recovery are up-
dated by broadening their application as for example the recent history of
res ipsa loquitur, the extension of warranty theories of recovery and strict
liability [Footnotes omitted.].'
Air carriers generally are held to "the highest degree of care" to their
passengers. This has not meant, however, that the carrier must "guard
against everything the human mind can imagine."4 Some courts have elu-
cidated the principle by referring to "the highest degree of care consistent
with the practical operation of the plane and protection of its passengers
from injury."' And historically, it had always been stressed that, in no
event, is an air carrier the insurer of its passengers! That principle, in fact,
has been referred to as "the universal rule."'
But despite the steadfast refusal of the courts to directly hold air car-
riers to be the insurers of their passengers, the "broadening" applications of
doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur are having that effect. Added to these
expanding judicial interpretations are such policy and regulatory creations
as the aforesaid American Law Institute doctrine of strict liability for
ground damage from aircraft and the recent United States-sponsored ab-
solute liability provisions in the Montreal Agreement covering United
States-foreign air transportation.
As a matter of judicial philosophy, the allegedly "modern" res ipsa
loquitur decisions simply close both eyes to the exhaustive, scientific inves-
tigations of air carrier accidents by the Civil Aeronautics Board (now,
under the Department of Transportation Act, by the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board.) One aviation law writer has commented:
It should be apparent that the use of the doctrine may have the effect
of making an air carrier, contrary to specific decisions, an insurer of the
safety of its passengers. In order to improve aviation safety, an extraordinary
amount of creative work has been done to develop and improve investigative
techniques; it is indeed strange that air carriers should find themselves sub-
ject to a rule which evolved long before such techniques, and which does
not reflect the advantages that inure to passengers.9
Of course, the principal purpose and concern of the comprehensive fed-
eral aviation accident investigation system is the advancement of safety,
not the determination of legal fault. It is to be doubted, however, that the
greater objective of aviation safety wilL encounter much sympathy in those
quarters where the prime interest is in individual dollar claims and recov-
eries. A well-known member of the negligence bar has put the matter quite
bluntly:
' Address by George I. Whitehead, Jr., Comments on Some Aspects of Civil Litigation from
Major Aircraft Accidents, 14, Aviation Law-Air Safety Symposium, University of Southern
California, 16 June 1964.4 R. FIXEL, THE LAW oF AVIATION § 487 (4th ed. 1967). See Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore
& Socony Mobil Co., 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959).
' Urban v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 288 (D. Wyo. 1956).
6 FIXEL, supra note 4; BILLYOU, supra note 1.
7 1 KREINDLER, AvIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 3.07 (1963).
8 Stephen, The Montreal Conference and International Aviation Liability Limitation, 33 J. Am
L. & CoM. 554 (1967).9 1BILYOU, supra note 1, at 106.
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While no one can quarrel with the importance of advancing safety,
it must be remembered that the purpose of the tort system is not to promote
aviation safety, but, rather, to properly compensate victims of accidents, and
to deter repetition by imposing the cost on the party at fault."0
To assert "deterrence" from imposing liability under res ipsa loquitur, in
circumstances where the accident resulted from known but unforeseeable
causes, such as, meteorological phenomenon or other act of God, is mani-
festly not supportable. It is this very detachment from primary cause de-
termination which makes the fairness of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
questionable in aviation accidents. While it must be recognized that there
are multiple causal factors in many accidents, the number of United States
major (and fatal) accidents of which the primary cause is classified as
"unknown" amounts to only slightly over 3.0 percent. Of the total 117
major (and fatal) jet aircraft accidents of the United States scheduled air-
lines from 1959 to 1 December 1967, CAB and other source data and ac-
cident analysis shows that: the primary cause for 36.0 percent of the acci-
dents was attributed to pilot error (with weather a contributing factor);
weather as a primary cause-25.0 percent; the air vehicle subsystem
(frame, powerplant and control systems)-27.0 percent; other causes-
9.0 percent; and "unknown" causes-3.0 percent.1'
It is evident from the analysis stated that weather is figured as a principal
element in a substantial percentage of the total accidents. Specifically, it
it has been stated that:
Inaccurate or incomplete weather reports not descriptive of the general
and specific weather conditions at the particular time and place of a jet
flight are the common problem. Unexpected storm turbulence and clear air
turbulence are significant causative factors in major damage to aircraft and
serious injury to occupants. 1
This is not to suggest that all adverse weather conditions are to be viewed
as acts of God. Acknowledgement must be made of the observation of a
leading aviation negligence writer and practitioner, that:
It must be pointed out, of course, that many so-called "Acts of God" are
simply manifestations of weather or meteorological conditions, which could
have been anticipated or avoided. It is clearly "the duty of a prudent operator
to take precautions against known possibilities," and the claimed negligence
is likely to be failure to do just that. [Footnotes omitted.].18
'While his assertion that "the claimed negligence is likely to be failure to
do just that" is probably strained, the basic premise of his comment is valid
for some cases. Air carriers at times do operate in marginal weather condi-
tions, although not when it is knowingly unsafe to do so. The ultimate "go-
no-go" decision is normally the decision of the pilot as the aircraft com-
mander. And, there is a logical presumption of due care on the part of the
deceased pilot in the event of a fatal accident, or as stated by one court:
1 Address by L. Kreindler, Tort Law and Aviation-for the Plaintiff, 4 Aviation Law-Air
Safety Symposium, University of Southern California, 16 June 1964.
"1 Air Transport Association, A Comparative Look at the World and U.S. Airline Jet Aircraft
Safety Record, 10 (December 1967).
12 Id.
13 KEINDLER, supra note 7, at § 3.13 (4).
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When a person is killed in an accident, there is a presumption arising from
the general knowledge of the strength of the instinct of self-preservation
and the natural desire to avoid pain and injury to oneself that the deceased
at the time of the accident was exercising due care.'4
The pilot, of course, makes his decision to go based on official weather
information and forecasts. Predictions of certain meteorological conditions,
such as clear air turbulence, however, are extremely difficult, if not im-
possible. 1 Even general weather conditions en route or at a destination can
change rapidly and drastically. Although the aircraft captain may have
exercised the highest degree of care in formulating his flight plan based on
weather advisories, his decision can be no better than his information. If
official weather information is inadequate or misleading, there may be, of
course, a question of government liability, as Mr. Peters will presumably
discuss in reviewing the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Hartz, Roth
Globe Indemnity Co. v. United States.6
The airline captain's qualification to exercise the high degree of care de-
manded of him is a function of careful selection and intensive professional
training and testing. It takes a pilot longer to qualify for command of an
airline aircraft than it does for a doctor to qualify for medical practice;
indeed, although the doctor never has to take an examination again, the pi-
lot does. He must maintain proficiency through a retraining program every
six months. This very high degree of care has enabled airlines to steadily
reduce the passenger fatalities rate despite faster, heavier and more complex
aircraft operating in increasingly crowded airspace as reflected in the fol-
lowing tabulation of five-year averages.
Passenger Fatalities
per






Despite this extraordinary, and virtually unparalleled, demonstration of
carrier and pilot dedication to the conscientious discharge of their respon-
sibility for air safety, the claimants' bar remains unimpressed. One of its
leading spokesmen and practitioners has commented on the airlines pro-
fessional pilot qualifications program as follows:
Thus, we have come to expect a stream of uniformed pilots, each testify-
ing to the rigorous training given to airline captains and co-pilots, and to
the particular qualifications of the pilot and co-pilot of the ill-fated airplane.
The footnote to this statement was as follows:
4 Morin v. Kreidt, 310 Pa. 90, 97, 164 A. 799 (1933). Cf. DeVere v. True-Flite, Inc., 10
Av. Cas. 17,239 (E.D. N.C. 1967); First National Bank v. Niagara Therapy Mfg. Corp., 229 F.
Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
"Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963).16Hartz, Roth & Globe Indemnity Co. v. U.S., 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
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It is a remarkable fact, in the cases that the author has tried, that the
pilot, in each case, was "above average." Apparently the safest thing an air-
line passenger can do is fly with a below average pilot. Such pilots never
seem to be involved in accidents.'
The inference of the quoted remarks is (a) that in all airlines accidents
(tried by the author), the pilot was in some degree at fault, and (b) that
above average pilots do not have accidents. Neither of these innuendoes
seems warranted. As already noted, pilot error has not been a prime causal
factor in most accidents. But an accident can happen to even the superior
pilot, through no fault of his own.
In trying to rationalize a theory of legal responsibility which will always
catch the aircraft operator, the plaintiffs' bar has had difficulty in making
up its mind whether aircraft accidents should be assimilated to surface
carrier accident, or distinguished from them. Actually, the negligence prac-
titioner argues both ways, depending on the purpose to be served-a near
classical case of Running with the Hare and Hunting with the Hounds.
For example, in arguing that where the claimant's case is based on pilot
negligence, the airline defendant should be precluded from offering evi-
dence as to pilot training and experience. A leading claimant's spokesman
says:
There is no reason why an airline crash case should be any different from
a bus case or a railroad case, and as a general proposition, just as proof of
conduct on prior occasions, and training and experience would be inadmiss-
able in most railroad and bus cases, such proof should be considered inad-
missible in airline cases."
But, when arguing that proximate cause should be found where the pilot
has not had sufficient experience in qualifying flights into a provisional air-
port where the accident occurred, the same author quotes with approval
from a dissenting opinion which contends:
What may be required as evidence of proximate cause in a trolley car
accident would not be a relevant standard in an accident involving a modern
air transport plane or the jet liner now at the threshold of air transportation. "
Even less justification appears for holding air carriers to strict liability, as
proposed in draft Section 520A on "Ground Damage from Aircraft," of the
Restatement of Torts, and as provided for United States origin and des-
tination passenger carriage in foreign air transportation under the Warsaw
Convention Interim Liability Agreement (the Montreal Agreement). Not
even an attempted rationalization for the Montreal Agreement provision
has been stated by the United States aeronautical agencies, which arbitrar-
ily forced absolute liability (viz., "waiver of defenses") on the world's
airlines as the price for withdrawing United States denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention.
At least the Council of the American Law Institute, in adopting Section
520A in 1965 by a vote of 92 to 57, purported to be "meeting the chang-
17 KREINDLER, supra note 7, at § 3.13 (8).
18 Id.
"9id. at § 3.11.
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ing laws" and rationalized that, "aviation has not yet reached the stage of
development where abnormal danger to persons or property below ceases
to exist . . . and while the safety record has been greatly improved, it still
cannot be said that the danger of ground damage has been so eliminated or
reduced that the ordinary rules of negligence law should be applied." 0 The
sponsors of Section 520A have recognized that the supporting comment
for the rule is extreme and unsupported, and have instructed the redraft-
ing of the official comment to delete references to "abnormally danger-
ous." Even so, new Section 520A, imposing strict liability on the owner
and the operator of the aircraft which causes harm to persons on the
ground, apparently still stands.
It is submitted that the contrary view is the correct and rational one,
as recommended to the Council by the distinguished reporter, Dean Pros-
ser, that:
The flights of most commercial airlines are to be classified as normal,
whether they are carrying passengers or freight. [So too are the flights of
private planes, conforming to government regulations, and operated by duly
qualified and licensed pilots.] As to these normal flights the responsibility for
ground damage stands on the same footing as damage resulting from the op-
eration of railroad trains or automobiles."l
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A, Tentative Draft No. 12, American Law Institute
(1966).
a1 Id.
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